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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTS?
Thomas B. Colby*

INTRODUCTION
The 21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, hosted by the DePaul Law Review, explored the outsized influence that business interests have had on the U.S. Supreme Court in
recent years. The panel on which I served addressed, among other
things, one aspect of that influence—the assertion that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions concerning business interests have “changed
the tort law landscape despite the traditional anchoring of tort principles in state legislation and judicial precedent.”1
The Court has altered the tort law landscape, to some degree, in a
number of subtle ways, including: (1) the expansion of arbitration; (2)
the growth of federal preemption; and (3) the funneling of class actions into federal courts combined with prodefendant interpretations
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These and the various other
legal developments that have been catalogued in this symposium have
all been quietly and indirectly changing the landscape of state tort law.
But, what about obvious and candid changes? Has the U.S. Supreme Court openly and directly changed the landscape of tort law?
To the extent that it has, it has done so largely through the mechanism
of constitutional law. Tort law is, generally speaking, state law.2 The
U.S. Constitution is a form of federal law. And, under the Supremacy
Clause, federal constitutional law trumps contrary state tort law.3
Thus, if we “constitutionalize” tort law, we federalize it.4 And, to the
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, George
Washington University Law School.
1. 21ST ANNUAL CLIFFORD SYMPOSIUM ON TORT LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE SUPREME
COURT, BUSINESS AND CIVIL JUSTICE (2015) [hereinafter CLIFFORD SYMPOSIUM BROCHURE]
(on file with the DePaul Law Review).
2. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to
the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1–3) (on file
with authors) (discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Unless, of course, we constitutionalize tort law through state constitutions, a phenomenon
that—although not the subject of this Article—does, indeed, have a long historical pedigree. See
John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS
L.J. 1159, 1196 (2005).
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extent that the U.S. Supreme Court is currently doing that at the behest of business interests, the business community is, indeed, openly
and directly changing “the tort law landscape despite the traditional
anchoring of tort principles in state legislation and judicial
precedent.”5
This Article discusses that phenomenon: the constitutionalization of
torts.6 Albeit briefly, it seeks to accomplish three objectives. First,
this Article explicates the potential for substantial constitutionalization of tort law.7 In short, the potential is there in spades; existing
constitutional doctrine provides ample opportunities for the U.S. Supreme Court to make massive forays into the traditional territory of
state tort law—virtually all of them through the operation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Second, this Article
explores the extent to which that enormous potential has, or has not,
been realized. My conclusion is that while the Court has admittedly
taken some significant steps in the realm of punitive damages,9 the
degree of constitutionalization of tort law generally is far short of
what it could be—even though the business community is constantly
pushing the Court to go much further. Indeed, outside of the punitive
damages arena, the Court has barely constitutionalized tort law at
all.10 Third, and finally, this Article explores why it is that this appar5. CLIFFORD SYMPOSIUM BROCHURE, supra note 1.
6. This phenomenon is not to be confused with the field of constitutional torts—federal “tort”
law causes of action against government officials for violating the Constitution. See generally
SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (3d ed. 2012) (describing federal tort
law). However, there is a relationship between the two because constitutional torts “involve the
use of the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause to convert state common law tort claims
involving governmental agents into federal civil rights cases.” See Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813, 815
(1987). This use of the Due Process Clause has the potential to “effectively federalize all personal injury or property damage claims against governmental employees.” Id.
7. The practice of constitutionalizing private tort law actually began in the 1960s with New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which held that the First Amendment, incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, places limits on the common
law tort of defamation. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). But, Sullivan and its progeny were prompted
by the interests of the civil rights community rather than the business community. See Christopher W. Schmidt, New York Times v. Sullivan and the Legal Attack on the Civil Rights Movement, 66 ALA. L. REV. 293, 310 (2014). And, they represent a much more narrow phenomenon:
the imposition of constitutional limits on the substantive content of a particular branch of tort
law, in the name of a particular substantive constitutional right. My primary concern in this
Article is with constitutionally imposed procedural and substantive limits on all torts, which are
advanced by the defense bar at the insistence of the business community.
8. See infra Part III; see generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part IV.
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ently probusiness Court11 has not seized the opportunity to engage in
more substantial constitutional tort reform. The answer, I think, is
multifaceted; but, I see three factors that are most likely responsible
for the Court’s reluctance. First, the Court’s decision to extend due
process protections to punitive damages was likely primarily motivated by the fact that those damages are a form of punishment—a
concern that does not extend to other aspects of tort law.12 Second,
the Court may be hesitant to expand due process any further into the
economic arena for fear of drawing uncomfortable comparisons to the
long-discredited Lochner era.13 Lastly, the Court’s reluctance can be
further explained by the fact that the Justices who are most likely to
sympathize with the tort reform movement are also the Justices who
are most committed to preserving the institution of constitutional federalism—and, thus, are disinclined to engineer a massive foray into
the traditional territory of state law.14
II.

DUE PROCESS
OF

AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages have long been a feature of state tort law inherited from the English practice.15 Before the Civil War, it was generally understood that the U.S. Constitution did not protect
fundamental, individual rights from state intrusion.16 As such, although there were many critics of punitive damages throughout the
nineteenth century—many of whom vociferously charged that punitive damages were grossly and fundamentally unfair—there was no
serious argument that their imposition in state court violated the
Constitution.17
After the war, the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment changed
the landscape of federalism by granting, for the first time, federal constitutional protection against state intrusion on fundamental rights.18
Of particular import, the Fourteenth Amendment expanded the Fifth
11. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431,
1449–50, 1451 tbl.7 (2013).
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 518 (1957).
16. Barron v. City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1843).
17. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 643–47 (2003) (discussing the arguments of the nineteenth century critics like Simon Greenleaf).
18. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81–82 (1991).
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Amendment’s due process guarantee19 to protect against due process
violations by state governments.
The constitutional guarantee of due process has long been read to
protect two (largely) distinct categories of rights, which are generally
referred to as rights of “procedural” and “substantive” due process.
First, the Clause “require[es] the government to follow appropriate
procedures when its agents decide to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property.”’20 “This is the concept of procedural due process,
which is [generally] concerned with giving fair notice and a fair hearing before the government deprives individuals of their liberty or
property.”21 Second, the Clause “bar[s] certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.”22 “This is the concept of substantive due process, which is
[generally] concerned with preventing governmental oppression and
with protecting fundamental rights from governmental interference.”23
Early on, in both their substantive and procedural capacities, the
Due Process Clauses were primarily interpreted in a backward looking fashion to only guarantee adherence to the historical baseline of
the common law.24 That is to say, the content of the due process guarantee was determined by reference “to those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England.”25 As such, the U.S. Supreme Court held the view that “a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due
process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in
England and in this country.”26
By that measure, the Fourteenth Amendment’s imposition of due
process constraints on the states had no effect on punitive damages.
Not long after the Amendment’s ratification, the Court declared that
because the “propriety and legality [of punitive damages] have been
recognized . . . by repeated judicial decisions for more than a century[,]” the “imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in [tort]
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
20. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
21. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present,
and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 400 (2008).
22. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
23. Colby, supra note 21, at 401 (footnote omitted).
24. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1170–71 (1988).
25. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855).
26. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884).
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cases cannot be opposed as in conflict with the prohibition against the
deprivation of property without due process of law.”27
But, in recent decades, the Court—although it still places great
weight on history and tradition—has expanded due process, in both its
procedural and substantive aspects, to extend beyond the strict historical baseline. On the procedural side, the Court now believes that
“history must be considered as supporting the proposition that [a particular practice] satisfies the demands of due process, but it is not decisive” because due process “can be as readily offended by the
perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the
adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values
of our constitutional heritage.”28 And, on the substantive side, the
Court now believes that “the specific practices of States at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment [do not mark] the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty, which the Fourteenth
Amendment protects.”29 In sum, on both the procedural and the substantive fronts, the Court has held that “continuing re-examination of
the constitutional conception of Fourteenth Amendment ‘due process’
of law is required, and that development of the community’s sense of
justice may in time lead to expansion of the protection which due process affords.”30
Thus, freed from the rigid constraints of history, the modern Court
has employed both substantive and procedural due process to place
constitutional limits on the venerable institution of punitive damages.
In 1989, the Court noted the issue but chose not to decide “whether
due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit.”31 Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion that tipped his hand on the unanswered question, raised both procedural and substantive due process
concerns regarding punitive damages. He first suggested that “the
Due Process Clause forbids damages awards that are ‘grossly excessive,’ or ‘so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to

27. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889) (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851)).
28. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1977) (citation omitted).
29. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
30. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15 (1964).
31. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 277 (1989).
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the offense and obviously unreasonable.’”32 This is a substantive concern.33 He then went on to argue that
[w]ithout statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the determination of how large an award of punitive damages is appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves in making
this important, and potentially devastating, decision. Indeed, the
jury in this case was sent to the jury room with nothing more than
the following terse instruction: “In determining the amount of punitive damages, . . . you may take into account the character of the
defendants, their financial standing, and the nature of their acts.”
Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do
not suggest that the instruction itself was in error; indeed, it appears
to have been a correct statement of Vermont law. The point is,
rather, that the instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are imposed by juries guided by little more than an
admonition to do what they think is best. Because the “‘touchstone
of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action
of government,’” I for one would look longer and harder at an
award of punitive damages based on such skeletal guidance than I
would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed.34

This is a procedural concern.
Subsequently, both of those concerns have found their way into majority opinions of the Court. Just two years later, in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance v. Haslip,35 the Court appeared to answer the substantive due process question in the affirmative, at least in dicta, although
it found no violation based on the facts of the case at bar.36 Two years
later, in 1993, the Court more clearly expressed the view “that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes a substantive limit on the amount of
a punitive damages award” but again found that the limit was not exceeded in the instant case.37
When the Court actually struck down excessive punitive damages
awards for the first time in the 1996 case of BMW of North America,
32. Id. at 280–81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919) and Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S.
86, 111 (1909)).
33. See Colby, supra note 21, at 403.
34. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
35. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
36. See id. at 23–24 (“We conclude, after careful consideration, that in this case it does not
cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety.”).
37. TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455, 462 (1993); see also Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994) (“Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution
imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages awards.” (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at
443 and Haslip, 499 U.S. 1)).
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Inc. v. Gore,38 and then in 2003’s State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,39 it hesitated to explicitly rely on substantive,
rather than procedural, due process, but it is difficult to read those
cases as grounded in anything other than substantive due process.40
In BMW, the Court again noted that the “Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor” and explained that “when an
award can fairly be categorized as grossly excessive in relation to” the
state’s “legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence,” it
“enter[s] the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”41 The Court then established
three “guideposts” to assist courts in determining whether an award is
unconstitutionally excessive:42
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.43

In Campbell, the Court applied those guideposts to invalidate an
award as clearly and obviously excessive.44
As for procedural due process, the Court has “strongly emphasized
the importance of the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause” in the realm of punitive damages and has held that because
“[p]unitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of
property[,]” certain “procedures are necessary to ensure that punitive
damages are not imposed in an [unconstitutionally] arbitrary manner.”45 Thus, the Court has held that procedural due process affords
the defendant the right to judicial review of the size of a punitive damage award46 and the right to de novo appellate review of a trial court’s
determination that a punitive damages award was not constitutionally
38. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
39. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
40. Colby, supra note 21, at 403–04; see Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001) (citing TXO for the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes
substantive limits on awarding “grossly excessive” punitive damages).
41. BMW, 517 U.S. at 562, 568 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454).
42. Id. at 574–75.
43. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
44. Id. at 418–29.
45. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420, 432 (1994); see Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Halsip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1991) (“[I]t is not disputed that a jury award [of punitive damages] may
not be upheld if . . . it was reached in proceedings lacking the elements of fundamental fairness.”
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989))).
46. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432. In Oberg, the Court held that judicial review had been an essential
safeguard even at common law. Id. at 421–32.
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excessive.47 And in its most recent significant punitive damages decision, Philip Morris USA v. Williams,48 the Court held that procedural
due process “forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties.”49
III.

THE ENORMOUS POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTS

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Haslip, which was
decided in 1991, that punitive damages awards are constrained by
both procedural and substantive due process, Robert Riggs published
an insightful article exploring the possible implications of that decision.50 Riggs’s article was primarily focused on what form the impending constitutionalization of punitive damages might take, but he
also observed that some of the Court’s reasoning in Haslip could be
applicable to other aspects of tort law as well.51 When the Court furthered its project of constitutionalizing punitive damages a dozen
years later in Campbell, Mark Geistfeld wrote an equally insightful
article documenting the extent to which the constitutional concerns
raised by the Campbell Court52 were not “unique to punitive damages,
implying that due process also constrains . . . other tort practice[s].”53
And, after the Court in Williams imposed still more limitations on punitive damages—this time in the name of a constitutional right to
“present every available defense”—54 observers pointed out the apparent applicability of the Court’s reasoning to other areas of tort
law—in particular, class actions for mass torts.55
Those insights were, indeed, insightful. Now that the Court has
shown a willingness to find due process problems even with long-established common law doctrines and practices (and also with modern
attempts to deviate from those practices in potentially unfair ways),
there are, indeed, a number of ways in which the Court’s constitutionalization of punitive damages could easily bleed over to other aspects
of tort law. In fact, if anything, previous commentators have probably
47.
48.
49.
50.

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
549 U.S. 346 (2007).
Id. at 353.
Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 859 (1991).
51. Id. at 897–98, 916.
52. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
53. Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2005).
54. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353–54 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
55. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 27 REV.
LITIG. 9, 29 (2007) (“[T]he Court’s theory of due process [in Williams] implies that class actions
are unconstitutional.”).
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understated the ripe potential for the constitutionalization of torts.
This Part briefly canvases the various possibilities and explicates the
extent to which lawyers representing the business community are giving the Court every opportunity to actualize them.
A. Excessive Noneconomic Compensatory Damages
Let us begin with the most obvious possible avenue for expanding
the punitive damages cases—the bridge from punitive to compensatory damages. The U.S. Supreme Court’s campaign to impose substantive due process constraints on punitive damages awards was
triggered by its concerns about the growing number of massive punitive awards being meted out by the tort system.56 Justice O’Connor
opened her dissent in the Browning Ferris case—the catalyst for constitutionalization—with the alarmist observation that “[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.”57
The same is now arguably true of noneconomic compensatory damages awards. In recent decades, there has been a significant increase
in the size of pain-and-suffering and mental anguish awards.58 Even
eight-figure awards, once unheard of, are no longer uncommon.59 If
punitive damages awards of this magnitude can violate the defendant’s
substantive due process rights when they rise to the level of grossly
excessive, then why is it that compensatory damages awards cannot do
the same?
Indeed, in a contribution to the 11th annual Clifford Symposium,
Mark Geistfeld observed that under the logic of the Court’s punitive
damages cases, a “defendant can also challenge a pain-and-suffering
award as being excessive in violation of substantive due process.”60 If
punitive damages awards are unconstitutional when they are grossly
excessive in relation to the state’s legitimate interests in punishment
and deterrence,61 then whatever the state’s interest is in awarding
compensatory damages for mental anguish and pain and suffering—
whether it is merely ensuring that injured parties are fully compen56. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Velco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
57. Id. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards:
Turning Compensation into “Punishment,” 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 64–67 (2002).
59. Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. &. PUB. POL’Y 231, 234 (2003).
60. Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 344 (2006); see Colleen P. Murphy, Statutory Caps and Judicial
Review of Damages, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1001, 1003–04, 1004 n.12 (2006) (suggesting that due
process might be violated without legislative caps and excessiveness reviews).
61. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
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sated or something more complex and elusive62—if the compensatory
award is grossly excessive in relation to that interest, it is unconstitutionally arbitrary and contravenes the due process guarantee.63
Justice Scalia—who was a frequent dissenter from the Court’s campaign to constitutionalize punitive damages, especially through the avenue of substantive due process64—has made this point as well, albeit
indirectly. In his dissent in BMW, Justice Scalia remarked that he,
unlike the majority, did “not regard the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive guarantees
against ‘unfairness’—neither the unfairness of an excessive civil compensatory award, nor the unfairness of an ‘unreasonable’ punitive
award.”65
Not surprisingly—given that Justice Scalia was on the losing end of
the punitive damages cases—lawyers for the business community have
frequently asked courts to extend the substantive due process excessiveness principle to compensatory damages.66
B. Arbitrariness and Excessive Jury Discretion
A second major avenue for potentially expanding the U.S. Supreme
Court’s punitive damages cases into other areas of tort law stems from
the notion in the punitive damages cases that the Due Process Clause
can be violated by legal doctrines that afford excessive discretion to
62. See Geistfeld, supra note 60, at 343 (“The conception of pain-and-suffering damages . . .
involv[es] redress for an ‘incommensurable’ injury . . . .”) (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 61 (1993)).
63. Geistfeld further notes that if the very nature of the state’s interest in damages for pain
and suffering damages is one that cannot be quantified, then the constitutional concern might be
intractable: “If the tort right necessarily implies that the injury cannot be translated into some
monetary amount, then a wide range of awards would seem to be appropriate, eliminating any
reasonable constraint on jury decisionmaking. The very nature of the tort right would be the
source of the constitutional problem.” Id. (footnote omitted). It would, after all, be impossible
to determine whether the amount of compensatory damages was grossly excessive in relation to
the state’s interest if the state’s interest—in, say, “public respect for the existence of certain
rights and public recognition of the transgressor’s fault in disrespecting those rights”—was of a
sort that was simply not “commensurate with money.” Id. (quoting Radin, supra note 62, at 61)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against ‘excessive’
or ‘unreasonable’ awards of punitive damages.”).
65. BMW, 517 U.S. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 47, Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tx. Ct. App.
2007) (No. 05-06-00136-CV), 2006 WL 2094252 (“Just as punitive damages can be unconstitutionally excessive, so also awards for mental anguish and other nebulous elements of damages
can be unconstitutionally excessive.” (citation omitted)); Motion for Leave To File Brief & Brief
of Amici Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 14–16, Daniel Measurement Servs. v. Eagle Research Corp., 552 U.S. 1056 (2007) (mem.) (No. 07-384), 2007 WL
3101377 [hereinafter Mfrs. et al. Brief].
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juries, raising the risk of arbitrary deprivation of property. The Court
has “emphasized time and again that ‘the touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.’”67 Recall Justice Brennan’s concern that this principle cannot
be squared with the fact “that punitive damages are imposed by juries
guided by little more than an admonition to do what they think is
best.”68 That concern was eventually picked up by the full Court: “Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in
choosing amounts . . . .”69
But, as Geistfeld noted, “that concern is not limited to punitive
damages.”70 The same can be said of noneconomic compensatory
damages. Since long before the recent punitive damages cases, commentators have been noting the fact that “[c]ourts have usually been
content to [instruct juries] that pain and suffering damages should
amount to ‘fair compensation’ or a ‘reasonable amount,’ without any
more definite guide.”71 Shortly after State Farm, Paul DeCamp wrote
an article in which he detailed the
similarities between punitive damages and noneconomic compensatory damages—including their common history and treatment, the
inadequate guidance available to juries, the amorphous nature of
the jury’s task, the absence of objective criteria to safeguard against
consideration of improper factors, and the lack of clear standards to
facilitate meaningful judicial review of verdicts.72

Those similarities, DeCamp argued, “logically call for comparable
treatment for purposes of procedural due process.”73
67. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell 418
U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
68. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. Honda Motor Corp. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994); see also Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (listing “arbitrariness” as one of “the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases refer”).
70. Geistfeld, supra note 53, at 1103.
71. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 545 (1973); see also Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 778 (1985)
(“Juries are left with nothing but their consciences to guide them.”).
72. DeCamp, supra note 59, at 291.
73. Id.; see also Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece
of Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1415 (2004) (“This dramatic story of the jurisprudence
relating to punitive damage awards is equally applicable to awards for pain and suffering. Indeed, awards for pain and suffering are even more vulnerable to constitutional attack.”); id. at
1417 (“[W]ithout rational criteria or defined limits, the pain and suffering award becomes the
same arbitrary deprivation of property as were punitive damage awards before cases like
[BMW].”); Riggs, supra note 50, at 907–08 (“[T]he extent and nature of jury discretion in setting
noneconomic compensatory damages is so similar to the jury’s discretion in fixing the amount of
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And, these concerns with vague jury instructions that offer little guidance to the jury extend well beyond compensatory damages. They
can be applied to many other areas of tort law as well. Geistfeld has
explained that model jury instructions regarding issues like negligence, for instance, “give the jury an amount of discretion that is not
significantly different than the discretion given by instructions on punitive damages.”74 Juries are instructed that the degree of care that is
reasonable turns on considerations of foreseeability and risk but are
not instructed how to weigh or evaluate those considerations, just as
juries are instructed that the amount of punitive damages turns on
considerations of retribution and deterrence but are not told how to
weigh or evaluate those considerations to arrive at an appropriate punitive damages award.75 Thus, in Riggs’s words:
it is hard to see how the typical instructions in a punitive damages
case can be held to violate due process (by leaving the jury with
‘unbridled discretion’) without also putting in doubt the large bodies of tort law that equally rely upon such subjective concepts as
negligence, gross negligence, malice, or conduct that is reckless,
wanton, willful and malicious.76

Riggs’s bottom line is that “if jury instructions in a punitive damages
case are too imprecise to satisfy due process, other significant bodies
of tort law are also called into question.”77
Despite the Court’s early suggestion that perhaps the common law
system for instructing juries on punitive damages was simply too arbitrary to survive due process review, the Justices ultimately upheld that
system.78 But, they did impose a number of procedural due process
limits on punitive damages in an effort to mitigate this concern.79
Recognizing the analogy to other aspects of tort law—particularly the
awarding of compensatory damages—lawyers for the business community have explicitly asked the Court to mandate “parity of treatpunitive damages that the two cannot be analytically distinguished. If leaving the amount of
punitive damages to the sound discretion of the jury offends the procedural guarantees of the
fifth amendment [sic], logically the common law discretion of juries to fix the amount of
noneconomic damages is similarly defective. And, if this is so, the alleged due process objection
to punitive damages once again calls into serious question other established rules of tort law.”).
74. Geistfeld, supra note 53, at 1104.
75. See id.
76. Riggs, supra note 50, at 897–98.
77. Id. at 916. “If due process is to remake the law of punitive damages by finding these
widely used concepts constitutionally infirm, it logically cannot stop until it has changed the
whole face of tort law . . . .” Id. at 898.
78. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (“[W]e cannot say that the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.”).
79. See supra Part I.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL207.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 13

2-AUG-16

THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTS?

9:40

369

ment of punitive and compensatory damages when it comes to the
minimum procedural safeguards required by due process.”80 Probusiness groups, including the National Association of Manufacturers, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Tort Reform Association, have begged the Court to “conclu[de] that due process requires
courts to provide adequate procedural safeguards against the risk of
erroneous deprivations of property through a compensatory damages
award inconsistent with the evidence.”81
C. Lack of Fair Notice
A related point can be made regarding the Court’s concern in the
punitive damages cases with fair notice. In BMW, the Court observed
that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
the penalty that a State may impose.”82 Because juries are given virtually unbridled discretion to fix the amount of punitive damages, the
Court has found that defendants who are hit with massive punitive
damages verdicts were often not on notice ex ante that they were subject to such a substantial award, which violates their due process
rights.83
Here, again, the Court’s concern is not logically limited to punitive
damages.84 Compensatory damages awards, especially those for
noneconomic damages, can also be far higher than might reasonably
be anticipated. In addition, judges’ and juries’ resolutions of other
fundamental questions of tort law—such as whether the defendant
80. Motion of the Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc., for Leave To File Brief as Amicus Curiae & Brief in Support of Petitioners at 3, Daniel Measurement Servs., Inc. v. Eagle Research
Corp. 552 U.S. 1056 (2007) (No. 07-384), 2007 WL 3101378. “The jury’s baseless multimilliondollar [compensatory] exaction should have been subjected to a ‘definite and meaningful constraint on discretion’ as is required under this Court’s punitive damages cases.” Id. at 4 (quoting
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22).
81. Mfrs. et al. Brief, supra note 66, at 14.
82. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417–18 (2003) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to classify arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process—of the law in general—is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A state can have no legitimate interest in
deliberately making the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based
solely upon bias or whim.” (quoting See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
83. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (listing “lack of notice”
as one of “the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases refer”);
BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
84. See Geistfeld, supra note 53, at 1109 (“The problem of vague tort rules is not limited to
punitive damages, nor is this constitutional concern limited to tort issues decided by juries.”).
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owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether an activity is abnormally dangerous so as to trigger strict liability—are similarly unpredictable ex ante and can likewise be said to lead to the imposition of
liability in the absence of fair notice.85 If the vagueness of tort law,
and its concomitant lack of fair notice, raises constitutional concerns,
then those concerns would seem to extend well beyond the realm of
punitive damages.86 Indeed, lawyers for the business community have
asked the courts to extend this principle into other areas of tort law.
For instance, in a product liability case, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers has argued that the principle established in BMW (that
a state may “not enforce an award that is outside the range of damages of which the defendant could reasonably have had notice with
respect to the conduct at issue . . .”) “fully applies to the imposition of
pain and suffering awards.”87
D. The Constitutional Right To Present Every Available Defense
In Williams, the Court held that “the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom
they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation.”88 The Court based this conclusion in part on the proposition that “the Due Process Clause prohibits
a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual with ‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’”89
Allowing punishment for harm to nonparties contravenes due process
rights because “a defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a
nonparty victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge, by
85. See id. at 1109–10.
86. As the Court recognized in Williams, the concerns with arbitrary verdicts, lack of notice to
the defendant, and excessive jury discretion discussed in this and the preceding Subsection raise
particular red flags when it comes to mass torts.
“[T]o permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless
dimension to the punitive damages equation. How many such victims are there? How
seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will
not likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate. And the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases
refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice—will be magnified.”
Williams, 549 U.S. at 354. This observation has obvious implications for class actions and other
attempts to address mass torts judicially—implications that are addressed in the following
subsection.
87. Brief of Amicus Curiae the All. of Auto. Mfrs. in Support of Appellants at 9–10, BuellWilson v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. D045154), 2006 WL
1286984.
88. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353.
89. Id. (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
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showing, for example” that the nonparty victim was not defrauded,
did not rely on the defendant’s statements, had a preexisting injury, or
the like.90
This passage has potentially massive implications for mass tort
cases, which extend even beyond the limits that it places on awarding
punitive damages in those cases. If the defendant has a constitutional
right to raise and litigate individualized defenses before being held
accountable for harming a victim, then it is arguably unconstitutional
to resolve mass tort cases through class actions or other forms of collective litigation that do not provide a mechanism for individualized
decision making. And, the potential implications extend even further
than that: beyond mass tort cases to any procedural rules in any tort
cases that preclude the defendant from effectively presenting defenses. Indeed, its implications might extend all the way to changes in
substantive tort law that eliminate traditional common law defenses.91
1. The Existence and Nature of the Right To Present Defenses
The Williams Court did not invent the right to present every available defense. That right has been around, in some form or another, for
decades. “The Court traditionally has held that the Due Process
Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, . . . as
defendants hoping to protect their property . . . .”92 Thus, a defendant
has a due process property interest in retaining the money sought by
the plaintiff as damages. And, the Court has traditionally held that
“the State may not finally destroy a property interest without first giving the putative owner an opportunity to present her claim of entitlement.”93 As such, a civil defendant must have a fair opportunity to
present her claim that the plaintiff does not have a right to the property. It follows that “[d]ue process requires that there be an opportu90. Id. at 353–54.
91. John Goldberg has noted the possibility that tort law might be constitutionalized in the
other direction—there may be a constitutional right on the part of the plaintiff to some form of
judicial redress for private wrongs. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:
Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (2005).
Goldberg argued: “Recognition of this right need not entail the federalization of tort law, or
even require that tort law remain a part of our legal system.” Id. But, he did assert that “this
right can and should be judicially enforced by establishing meaningful but capacious limits on
the ways in which, and the reasons for which, legislatures may undertake plaintiff-unfriendly tort
reform.” Id. Goldberg’s argument is characteristically compelling and well supported. But, if
the organizing assumption of this 21st Annual Clifford Symposium is correct—that the U.S.
Supreme Court has become unduly beholden to business interests—his argument would seem
unlikely to gain much traction with the current Court.
92. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982).
93. Id. at 434.
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nity to present every available defense.”94 If the defendant has a
defense to liability under the governing substantive law, she must be
given a fair opportunity to litigate it. Any procedural rule or device
that the court employs to deny her that opportunity—such as rules of
waiver or default—must be a constitutionally fair one.95
2. The Applicability of the Right to Class Actions
The right to present defenses, especially as articulated and developed in Williams, would seem to have significant implications for class
actions—especially those arising out of mass torts. Because a class
action, by its very nature, “is a lawsuit in which a representative litigates the common claims of a class of individuals too numerous to join
to the case individually[,]”96 a mass-tort class action defendant runs
the risk of being held liable to a large class of alleged victims, only a
few of whom are actually present and directly represented in the
courtroom. To the extent that the class action is used to find the defendant liable to the entire class based solely on the representative
proceedings and without any opportunity for the defendant to raise
and litigate individualized defenses that it might have to the claims of
individual members of the class,97 Williams calls that practice into
question.98 And, that in turn might threaten the very viability of the
mass tort class action in the first place. After all, as Mark Moller
noted: “When defendants want to rely on individualized evidence—
94. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 66 (quoting Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)).
95. See Riggs, supra note 50, at 869; cf. Logan, 455 U.S. at 437 (“And the State certainly
accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule.”).
96. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:2 (5th ed. 2011).
97. Often, class actions make use of bifurcation or other forms of divided trial in which first
the common issues are resolved on a class-wide basis and then individual issues are subsequently
litigated. Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for
Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 702–07 (2006). As long as the defendant retains
the right to litigate the individual issues, those proceedings would not seem to violate the principle announced in Williams, although they may raise other problems under, for instance, the
Seventh Amendment. Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation
After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 433, 447 (2008). Williams has the most
obvious effect on mass tort class actions seeking punitive damages. Sometimes, courts adjudicate
issues relating to punitive damages—both liability and amount—on a class-wide basis first (either through class-wide evidence or sampling) before turning to issues of individualized liability
and compensatory damages. Williams “suggests that these punitives-first class trial plans will
offend due process” because they do not “allow[ ] the defendant to offer every available defense,
nor provide[ ] sufficient information on the extent of harm to those other than the class representatives, such that the punitive award can be said to bear a ‘reasonable relationship’ to compensatory damages.” Id. at 446.
98. Actually, because of due process concerns, the courts did not allow this to happen often
even before Williams. See Colby, supra note 17, at 653–56.
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that is, evidence unique to individual claims—it’s simply impossible to
lump together large numbers of those claims into a class action and, at
the same time, respect defendant’s [sic] rights to present that
evidence.”99
Not surprisingly, then, ever since the Williams decision, class action
defendants have inundated the U.S. Supreme Court with requests to
extend the Williams rule into the class action context.100 They have
insisted that because a “defendant in a class action has a due process
right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims,” a class action “cannot be certified in a way that eviscerates this right or masks
individual issues.”101 Thus, they argued that “it violates due process
to facilitate classwide adjudication by permitting the use of extrapolation to relieve individual class members of their burden of proof and
by eliminating class-action defendants’ right to raise individualized
defenses.”102
3. The Applicability of the Right Beyond Class Actions
Even beyond the mass tort and class action context, the constitutional right to present every available defense has significant potential
to unsettle state tort law. This notion suggests that state adjudicatory
rules or procedures that limit the ability to effectively raise and litigate
defenses could be held to fall below a minimum constitutional threshold of fairness. It even perhaps suggests that there are limits on a
state’s ability to cut back on the defenses available to defendants as a
matter of substantive tort law.

99. Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants’ New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 319, 319.
100. See id. (“[I]n countless briefs filed at the state and federal levels, class action defendants
complain that trial courts are ignoring their due process right to a fair hearing.”).
101. Brief of Allergan, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Jacobsen, 134 S. Ct. 2135 (2014) (No. 13-916), 2014 WL 825203 (quoting Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013)).
102. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16–17, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Braun (No. 14-1124),
2015 WL 1201368 [hereinafter Braun Petition]; see also Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
et al. as Amici Curiae in support of petitioner at 1–2, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct.
2768 (2013) (mem.) (No. 12-1067), 2013 WL 1342732; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2,
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen., 555 U.S. 1085 (2008) (No. 08-557), 2008 WL 4735255
(“Rather than determine these inherently individualized compensatory damages on individual
proof, the state court assessed them on the basis of classwide formulas. That end-run around the
necessary proof deprives the defendants of the chance to address each plaintiff’s actual damages,
thus denying them their fundamental due process right ‘to present every available defense.’ ”
(quoting Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007)).
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a. Procedural Limits on Presenting Defenses
In its punitive damages cases, the Court has explicitly noted that a
state’s “abrogation of a well-established common-law protection
against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that its
procedures violate the Due Process Clause.”103 That presumption
would seem to extend beyond the punitive damages context to the
abrogation of any procedures that allow a tort defendant to present its
defenses. Imagine, for instance, that a state were to provide—
whether by statute, court rule, or judicial precedent—that whenever a
defendant raises a legitimate tort defense in a timely and appropriate
manner, the judge must flip a coin to decide whether to allow the defense to go forward. That procedure would almost certainly be held
to violate the defendant’s constitutional right to present every defense.104 So too, presumably, would a procedural rule that allowed a
tort plaintiff to defeat any defense or affirmative defense simply by
raising a scintilla of evidence that contradicts it.105
It follows that other less draconian limitations on the ability to present an effective defense could be found to violate due process as well.
For instance, the Court has held that a “legislative presumption is invalid when it is entirely arbitrary . . . or operates to deprive a party of
a reasonable opportunity to present the pertinent facts in his de-

103. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994).
104. Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “flip[ping] a coin” as a mechanism for judicial decision making “is forbidden by the requirements of fair adjudicative procedure that the Due Process Clause reflects”); Lemke v. Cass Cty.,
Neb., 846 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, C.J., concurring) (arguing that making zoning
decisions by flipping a coin would violate due process).
105. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court famously held that the appropriate amount of process
due before the government deprives someone of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest should be determined by balancing: (1) the nature of the private interest affected by the
official action; (2) the risk of error and the effect of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the
governmental interest. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The “Court has engaged in a straightforward
consideration of the factors identified in Mathews to determine whether a particular standard of
proof in a particular proceeding satisfies due process.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754,
(1982). And, the Court has explained that under that test, a preponderance of the evidence
standard is constitutionally appropriate for “the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute
between private parties.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). This is so because although “private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute over money damages, application of a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard indicates both society’s ‘minimal
concern with the outcome,’ and a conclusion that the litigants should ‘share the risk of error in
roughly equal fashion.’ ” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423); cf.
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the Mathews test to conclude that a
“some credible evidence” standard of proof for placing names on a child abuse registry does not
comport with due process).
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fense.”106 A state “must not, under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude [a] party from the right to
present his defense.”107 Thus, “in either criminal or civil cases,” a rule
of procedure or evidence may “not shut out from the party affected a
reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the
facts bearing upon the issue” else “due process of law has been denied
him.”108
Having recently revitalized this line of cases in Williams, the Court
could easily expand it to other areas of tort law. And, in recent years,
lawyers for the business community have asked the Court to do just
that. For example, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Brown,109 lawyers
argued that a “marked deviation from common law principles of issue
preclusion . . . violates due process rights protection by the 14th
Amendment”110 when it has the effect of denying the defendant “an
opportunity to present every available defense.”111 Lawyers have also
asked the courts to extend this principle to, for instance, evidentiary
decisions that precluded the defendant from introducing evidence
proffered in support of a legal defense112 and state statutes that allegedly preclude the defendant in a products liability case from introducing evidence that would enable it to show that its product was not
legally defective.113 In other words, lawyers have been asking the
courts to find both that certain evidentiary and procedural rules themselves violate due process because they prevent the defendant from
mounting an effective defense and, also, that particular procedural
and evidentiary rulings—applications of otherwise acceptable rules—
106. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 19 (1931); see also Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (holding that irrebutable presumptions that are not universally true can
violate due process).
107. Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
108. Id.; cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429–30 (1982) (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been interpreted as preventing the States from denying
potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would be ‘the
equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s].’ ” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971)).
109. 134 S. Ct. 2726 (2014) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
110. Motion for Leave To File Brief & Brief of Wash. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 12, Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 13-1187), 2014 WL 1783197.
111. Id. at 13 (quoting Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007)).
112. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant Scotwood Indus., Inc. at 13–15, Scotwood Indus. v. Meats, 4
N.E.3d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (tbl.) (No. 29A05-1305-SC-229), 2013 WL 5574723; Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 21–29, City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Fire Fighters Pension &
Relief Fund, 135 S. Ct. 148 (2014) (mem.) (No. 13-1528), 2014 WL 2858181.
113. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellant Gen. Motors Corp. at 46–49, Reynolds v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 390 F. App’x 961 (2010) (No. 08-16182-CC), 2009 WL 898388.
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violate due process whenever they have the effect of excluding essential exculpatory evidence.
b. Due Process Limits on Altering Substantive Tort Law
The Court could even hold that due process imposes constitutional
limits not just on a state’s alteration or application of its procedural
rules, but also on its substantive rules—its ability to abolish certain
traditional defenses from its substantive tort law. It is true that the
Court has indicated that a “defense, like an element of the tort claim
itself, is merely one aspect of the State’s definition of [the] property
interest.”114 Because “the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest,” it would appear to follow that although a state “may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards[,]”115 a state
should be constitutionally free to abolish the defense, thus revoking
the property interest altogether.116
Indeed, as far back as 1876, the Court explained that a “person has
no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.”117
Thus, “[r]ights of property which have been created by the common
law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a
rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of
the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.”118
But, note that last clause: “unless prevented by constitutional limitations.” As John Goldberg has explained, this “passage could be
read to endorse unfettered legislative discretion to expand or shrink
tort law, but that was not its meaning.”119 In fact, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court repeatedly took seriously due process challenges to state attempts to make the substantive
law of torts more favorable to plaintiffs.120 Although it never found a
due process violation, the Court insisted that, as a matter of due process, new rules of tort law cannot depart “so substantially from the
terms of regulation at common law as to evidence an attempt at out114. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 n.5 (1980).
115. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 490 n.6 (1980).
116. See id. (“Of course, the State remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities
for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether . . . .”).
117. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
118. Id.
119. Goldberg, supra note 91, at 569.
120. See id. at 569–72; see, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888) (upholding
the abolition of the fellow servant rule for suits by railroad employees against employers); Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (considering whether a statute mandating double
damages for harm to livestock caused by railroads violated due process).
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right redistribution” of property.121 In one case, the Court strongly
implied that it would violate due process to craft substantive tort law
in a way that would allow for the imposition of liability on a defendant
who was not actually responsible for the plaintiff’s injury.122
Of course, abolishing traditional tort defenses could have precisely
that effect. Thus, some nineteenth century courts struck down state
laws that did just that. For instance, many courts invalidated state
statutes that made railroad companies liable for injuries to animals
run over by trains without any showing of which party—the railroad
or the animal owner—was truly at fault.123 As one court put it, this
action violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it “precludes the corporation from exculpating itself or making
any defense whatever.”124 Under such a statute, “not only is the corporation prevented from showing its own care and diligence, and the
unavoidable character of the accident, but it is also precluded from
showing the contributory negligence, or even design, of a plaintiff in
causing the injury.”125 That preclusion contravenes the due process
guarantee: “Any statute that forecloses a defendant, and precludes all
defense, and denies the ‘day in court,’ is, and must be, unconstitutional and void.”126
Some courts in that era reached the same conclusion in striking
down workers’ compensation statutes.127 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately disagreed that workers’ compensation laws violate this constitutional principle. But, even so, the Court specifically noted:
Nor is it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to say that a
State might, without violence to the constitutional guaranty of “due
process of law,” suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting
liability as between employer and employee, without providing a
reasonably just substitute. . . . [I]t perhaps may be doubted whether
the State could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all
defenses on the other, without setting up something adequate in
their stead.128

In other words, a state could be found in violation of due process if it
altered the traditional defenses of substantive tort law in a way that
121. Goldberg, supra note 91, at 569.
122. See id. at 571–72 (discussing Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906)); see also Witt, supra
note 4, at 1176, 1184 (noting the extent to which state courts in this era reached the same conclusion as a matter of state constitutional law).
123. See Witt, supra note 4, at 1177–79.
124. Denver & Rio Grand Ry. Co. v. Outcalt, 31 P. 177, 179–80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1892).
125. Id. at 180.
126. Id.
127. See Witt, supra note 4, at 1185–88.
128. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).

R
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effectively eliminated the defendant’s ability to establish that it did
not cause the injury.
Armed with Williams, and with these old precedents at the ready in
the quiver, the modern Court could conclude that a particular rule of
substantive tort law that has the effect of allowing liability without
causation generates results so arbitrary as to violate due process. After all, it “remain[s] true that the State’s interest in fashioning its own
rules of tort law is paramount to any discernable federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state
action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational.”129
Indeed, the business community has urged the Court to do just that.
For instance, in American Cyanamid Co. v. Gibson,130 the business
community asked the Court to declare that a recent judge-made
change to the common law of Wisconsin—the introduction of the socalled “risk contribution” theory131—contravenes the principle announced in Williams: the Due Process Clause does not allow a defendant to be held liable without being given an opportunity to litigate
every available defense. The Williams principle, the lawyers claimed,
necessarily implies that “the Due Process Clause incorporates a causation requirement.”132
129. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980). One could draw an analogy to criminal
law because the Court has sometimes suggested that, as a matter of constitutional law, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable without the state establishing that her conduct was genuinely wrongful in some meaningful way. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962) (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of
having a common cold.”). Thus, some courts have held that “the Constitution prohibits a state
from eliminating the justification of self-defense from its criminal law.” See, e.g., Isaac v. Engle,
646 F.2d 1129, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting), rev’d, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
see also, e.g., Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1187 n.37 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“It is difficult
to the point of impossibility to imagine a right in any state to abolish self defense altogether,
thereby leaving one a Hobson’s choice of almost certain death through violent attack now or
statutorily mandated death through trial and conviction of murder later.”).
130. 135 S. Ct. 2311 (2015) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
131. The risk contribution theory has the effect of allowing those injured by lead paint to
recover against lead paint manufacturers who were active in the marketplace during the relevant
time period without proof that the defendant was the manufacturer of the particular paint that
injured the plaintiff.
132. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27–31, Gibson, 135 S. Ct. 2311 (No. 14-849), 2015 WL
241883; see also Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39–43, Bus. for a Better N.Y. v. Angello, 341 F.
App’x 701 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-4415-cv), 2007 WL 6475514 (urging the courts to hold a New
York labor law that imposes strict liability on owners and contractors for accidents involving
ladders and scaffolding unconstitutional because under that law, “defendants are not able to
explain the circumstances of the accident or to establish defenses such as comparative negligence[,]” which denies them “an opportunity to put on a meaningful defense”); Brief for Amici
Curiae the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. et al. in Support of Petitioners at 11–14, Gibson, 135 S. Ct. 2311
(No. 14-849), 2015 WL 678183; (“The basic guarantee of due process in a civil trial is that a
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E. Individualized Unfairness
On top of all the arguments previously discussed, if “[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of government”133—if, that is, the “touchstone of Due Process
is fundamental fairness”134—then it is possible to imagine the U.S. Supreme Court overturning a tort verdict against a large corporation on
the simple ground that the Court believes that the verdict was arbitrary and unfair. This was a point Justice Scalia made in dissenting
from the Court’s punitive damages decisions—their reasoning logically extends to all unfair tort verdicts.
Indeed, if the Court is correct, it must be that every claim that a
state jury’s award of compensatory damages is “unreasonable” (because not supported by the evidence) amounts to an assertion of
constitutional injury. And the same would be true for determinations of liability. By today’s logic, every dispute as to evidentiary
sufficiency in a state civil suit poses a question of constitutional moment, subject to review in this Court. That is a stupefying
proposition.135

Just as the Court has found that, in criminal law, due process requires
judges to review state-imposed jury verdicts to ascertain whether the
evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find liability,136 it could
reach the same conclusion in civil law.137
Here too, lawyers representing the business community have asked
the Court to take the next step. General Motors, for instance, has
petitioned the Court to extend the rules of this sort established in
criminal and punitive damages cases to all civil cases. Noting that the
“Court has long held that due process forbids a state criminal conviction where there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, of guilt[,]”
and that the Court has found that “if there is insufficient evidence to
justify the size of a punitive damage award, the award violates due
process[,]” General Motors has asked the Court to “address[ ] the
defendant will not be held liable for damages without a meaningful opportunity to present every
available defense to liability, including a defense based upon lack of causation.”).
133. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
134. Quill Corp. v. N. Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 n.2 (1992) (citing N. Dakota v. Quill, 470
N.W.2d 203, 214–15 (N.D. 1991)).
135. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
136. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
137. Analogies might also be drawn to cases like Bouie v. City of Columbia, in which the
Court held that state court judgments that seem to deviate grossly from any fair interpretation or
application of state law violate due process. 378 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1964).
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problem in what is probably its most common setting: the threshold
determination of liability in civil litigation.”138
IV. EXPLAINING THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTS TO DATE
As discussed in Part II, at the behest of the business community, the
U.S. Supreme Court has imposed a variety of constitutional limits of
punitive damages awards. And, as further discussed in Part II, much
of the logic and reasoning behind the Court’s punitive damages decisions could easily be extended to compensatory damages and to many
other aspects of tort law as well. Indeed, as Part III then explained,
the business community has been aggressively encouraging the Court
to do just that.
Yet, the Court has taken virtually no steps to constitutionalize tort
law beyond the realm of punitive damages—despite the ample opportunities and clearly illuminated doctrinal avenues to do so. The closest that the Court has come is in the area of class actions. In Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,139 the Court refused to allow a class action proceeding to rely on “Trial by Formula” in lieu of affording the defendant “the right to raise any individual affirmative defenses it may
have, and to ‘demonstrate’” that particular individual class members
were not treated unlawfully.140 But, that case—which arose in federal
court and involved federal antidiscrimination law (not state tort
law141)—was based on an interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act142
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23143 rather than the Constitu138. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–16, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 513 U.S. 928
(1994) (No. 94-139), 1994 WL 16042842; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP v. Rosenthal, 562 U.S. 963 (2010) (No. 10-243), 2010 WL 3279297
(“State Farm and Philip Morris thus establish that it violates due process to impose punitive
damages for acts for which liability has not been established. So also does due process preclude
the imposition of a compensatory damages award unsupported by a finding of liability.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 19–20, Garlock, Inc. v. Pool, 508 U.S. 909 (1993) (No. 92-1502),
1993 WL 13075797 (asking the Court to find, in a products liability case, that an award of compensatory damages made in the absence of evidence of causation violates due process); Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 19–20, 29, Doughboy Recreational, Inc. v. Fleck, 507 U.S. 1005
(1993) (No. 92-1305), 1993 WL 13075622.
139. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
140. Id. at 2561 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977)).
141. For a discussion of how the Court has clumsily imported principles of tort law into federal antidiscrimination law, see Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Law: The New Franken-Tort,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). Sperino noted the possibility that
the Court’s twisting of tort concepts in antidiscrimination law might migrate back to the realm of
tort law, thereby reshaping the underlying tort law itself. See id. (manuscript at 51). To the
extent that this happens, it represents another form of federalizing tort law.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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tion.144 The Court did not cite or rely on Williams or any other punitive damages decision.
Wal-Mart, no doubt, “lent credence to [the] novel argument from
the class action defense bar: that . . . defendants have a due process
right to individualized adjudication of liability when plaintiffs differ in
any meaningful way.”145 Lawyers representing the business community have sought to combine Wal-Mart with Williams to establish that
the Wal-Mart rule is of constitutional dimension.146 Still, despite what
the business lawyers claim is a substantial split of authority in the
lower courts,147 the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to take up the
issue. In 2010, before Wal-Mart was even decided, Justice Scalia—
subsequently the author of the majority opinion in Wal-Mart—declared, in the course of issuing a stay in his capacity as Circuit Justice,
that there was a reasonable probability that four Justices would vote
to grant certiorari on the issue of whether the Constitution permits a
class action to be structured in a way that denies the defendant the
opportunity to present every available individualized defense. And
Justice Scalia further opined that there was a significant possibility
that the Court would ultimately find such a class action unconstitutional.148 But, the Court ultimately denied certiorari in that case149
and in every other case presenting the issue thus far.
The question is why not? Why has the Court not seized the opportunity to extend the punitive damages cases into other areas of tort
law? The answer is, no doubt, multifaceted. Perhaps it is due in part
to a bunch of little things. For instance, the Seventh Amendment
might preclude the Court from requiring the same exacting judicial
review of the excessiveness of compensatory damages awards, at least
those issued by federal juries, that it now requires for punitive dam144. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
145. Joshua A. Rosenthal, Comment, The Case Against Constitutionalized Commonality Standards for Collective Civil Litigation, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309, 310 (2013); see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Bradley J. Hamburger, Three Myths About Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 45, 55–57 (2014) (arguing that because the “Trial by
Formula” procedure in Wal-Mart violated the Rules Enabling Act, “it was unnecessary for the
Court to expressly rule that this deprivation also violated due process[,]” but Williams nonetheless makes clear that “there is little doubt that the Court would have found a due process violation if it had been necessary for it to reach the issue”).
146. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jimenez, 135 S. Ct.
2835 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-910), 2015 WL 350579.
147. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16–21, La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Oubre,
133 S. Ct. 30 (2012) (mem.) (No. 11-1252), 2012 WL 1374528 (detailing the alleged split of
authority).
148. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1, 3–4 (2010) (Scalia, J., Circuit Justice).
149. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011) (mem.) (denying
certiorari).
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ages.150 But, I want to suggest here that there are three principal dynamics that best explain why the Court has not expanded the punitive
damages cases into other areas of tort law.
A. The Uniqueness of Punishment
The biggest factor, I think, is that the punitive damages cases were
far more focused on what the Court perceived to be the unique constitutional concerns surrounding punishment than commentators have
generally acknowledged. As explained supra, it is true that much of
the logic and reasoning behind the punitive damages cases could, if
taken in isolation and out of context, be extended to other tort doctrines.151 But, it is a mistake to take that reasoning out of context. I
believe that in making those connections, commentators and advocates have tended to underestimate the extent to which it is the “punitive” aspect of punitive damages that has been driving the Court’s
cases all along.
Geistfeld sagely noted that under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which generally governs procedural due process cases,152 one
of the key factors in the balance is “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action.”153 At the end of the day, the defendant’s interest in avoiding compensatory damages—and tort liability
generally—is basically the same as its interest in avoiding punitive
damages; it wishes to avoid the restrictions on its liberty that come
from the behavioral modifications mandated by the imposition of legal duties, and it wishes to avoid the demands on its property that
come from being forced to pay a judgment.154 “When formulated in
this manner,” Geistfeld noted, “the due process inquiry shows that
any constitutional concern generated by punitive damages is also generated by other tort practices.”155
True enough, but I do not believe that the Court would formulate
the inquiry in this manner. I believe that the Court’s due process concerns regarding punitive damages are intimately tied up with the ways
150. DeCamp, supra note 59, at 290–91; Geistfeld, supra note 60, at 345. The Court has held
that “the measure of actual damages suffered . . . presents a question of historical or predictive
fact” that the Seventh Amendment commits to the jury, whereas the level of “punitive damages
does not constitute a finding of ‘fact’ ” and, therefore, “appellate review of the district court’s
determination that an award [of punitive damages] is consistent with due process does not implicate . . . Seventh Amendment concerns.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 437 (2001).
151. See supra Part III.
152. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); supra note 105.
153. Geistfeld, supra note 53, at 1095 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
154. See id. at 1101–02.
155. Id. at 1101.

R
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in which those damages can unfairly inflict punishment. “Although
these awards [ostensibly] serve the same purposes as criminal penalties,” the Court has uneasily noted that “defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections
applicable in a criminal proceeding.”156 It is this concern that animates the due process limitations that the Court has imposed on punitive damages—the insistence that “[p]unitive damages are not a
substitute for the criminal process.”157 The constitutional guarantee
of due process mandates the provision of a number of important procedural safeguards to those at risk of criminal punishment—including,
for instance, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
privilege against self-incrimination.158 In awarding punitive damages,
“[g]reat care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess
[what are really] criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the
heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof.”159 As I have endeavored
to explain in great detail elsewhere, Williams in particular is best understood as an attempt to ensure that punitive damages are not, in
fact, simply criminal penalties by another name. Criminal penalties
are punishment for public wrongs, whereas punitive damages are punishment for private wrongs—a form of legalized revenge that is conceptually and procedurally distinct from criminal punishment. That is
why the Williams Court held that punitive damages may not be imposed to punish a defendant for the harm that it caused to individuals
not before the court: because a civil case is solely concerned with the
harm to the plaintiffs not the harm done to society as a whole. Due
process will not tolerate a court imposing punishment for the full
wrong to society—the public wrong—without affording the full panoply of criminal procedural safeguards.160 In other words, Williams
prevents tort law from serving as criminal law in disguise. But, as long
as tort law is truly tort law, Williams does not have much to say about
it.161
156. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
157. Id. at 428.
158. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
159. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428.
160. See Colby, supra note 21, at 401–08.
161. The Court’s reliance on the right to present every available defense in Williams should be
understood in this light. Although in criminal law “there is no due process problem with punishing the defendant for the harm that it did to society as a whole without affording individualized
defenses for each and every victim[,]” in civil law, it is “surely unconstitutional to punish a defendant for a series of individual, private, tortious wrongs without providing evidence that it did
indeed commit each alleged private wrong, and without affording the defendant the opportunity
to raised individualized defenses for each alleged wrong.” Id. at 412, 413 n.86.

R
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To a lesser extent, the same can be said of the Court’s other punitive damages cases; they were primarily motivated by the fact that punitive damages can be “described as quasi-criminal.”162 For instance,
in Halsip, the Court favorably quoted this passage from an earlier
concurrence by Justice O’Connor, the leader of the charge for punitive damages reform:
Mississippi law gives juries discretion to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a defendant acts with a certain mental state. In my view, because of the punitive character of
such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due
Process Clause.163

“What we are concerned with is the possibility that a culpable defendant may be unjustly punished . . . .”164
Thus, by way of further example, the Court’s concern that the defendant must be given “fair notice” of the potential severity of the
damages award165 was explicitly tied to the punitive character of the
award. “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only
of the conduct that will subject [her] to punishment, but also of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”166 In support of this
162. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1783–84 (2012) (arguing that
the Court’s constitutionalization of punitive damages might be explained as a reaction to the
ways in which punitive damages have evolved from their private law origins into “something
different and closer to criminal law”).
163. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see
also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Judicial intervention in cases of excessive awards also has the critical function of ensuring that
another ancient and fundamental principle of justice is observed—that the punishment be proportionate to the offense.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 47–48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Here, . . . the
civil/criminal distinction is blurry. Unlike compensatory damages, which are purely civil in character, punitive damages are, by definition, punishment. They operate as ‘private fines levied by
civil juries to advance governmental objectives. Because Alabama permits juries’ to inflict these
potentially devastating penalties wholly at random, the State scheme is void for vagueness.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974))).
164. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 429 (1994) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421 (“A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been
lawful where it occurred.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) (“The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.” (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454)); id. at 585 (“We cannot,
however, accept the conclusion of the Alabama Supreme Court that BMW’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to justify a punitive sanction that is tantamount to a severe criminal penalty.”);
Orberg, 512 U.S. at 434–35 (“A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of an exaction of
exemplary damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
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proposition, the Court cited a handful of criminal cases and then
stated: “The strict constitutional safeguards afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases, but the basic protection
against ‘judgments without notice’ afforded by the Due Process
Clause, is implicated by civil penalties.”167
The importance of the punitive nature of the sanction to the Justices’ understanding of the due process limitations imposed on it is
perhaps most clearly evinced by Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc.,168 in which the Court held that due process requires
de novo review of a trial court’s evaluation of the constitutionality of a
punitive damages award.169 The heart of the Court’s reasoning consisted of comparing punitive damages to criminal penalties and contrasting them with compensatory damages.
Although compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same time by the same decisionmaker, they
serve distinct purposes. The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. The latter, which have been described as “quasicriminal,” operate as “private fines” intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury’s assessment of the
extent of a plaintiff’s injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its
moral condemnation.170

The Court went on to note that “[d]espite the broad discretion that
States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and
punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that
discretion.”171 Repeatedly citing BMW, a punitive damages case, interchangeably with death penalty, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and excessive criminal fines cases, the Court
explained that in all of “these cases, the constitutional violations were
predicated on judicial determinations that the punishments were
‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of . . . defendant[s’] offense[s]’”
and elucidated that all of these contexts involve the same “relevant
constitutional line.”172 The Court ultimately concluded that its “decisions in [these] analogous cases, together with the reasoning that produced those decisions, thus [convinced them] that courts of appeals
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 574 n.22 (citation omitted) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977)).
532 U.S. 424 (2001).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 433–34 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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courts’ determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards.”173
In sum, to a very substantial degree, it is the close analogy to criminal penalties that has been the primary force behind the Court’s constitutionalization of punitive damages,174 and that analogy simply does
not carry over to the rest of tort law. That is the best explanation for
why, even though logical and compelling doctrinal arguments can be
crafted in favor of extending the punitive damages cases into other
torts contexts, the Court is not particularly interested in doing so. To
be sure, the potential for massive constitutionalization is there, but it
is not a potential that the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to actualize any
time soon because what has actually been motivating the Court in the
punitive damages context is limited to that context alone.175
B. The Specter of Lochner
The second major factor that I believe explains the Court’s reluctance to further constitutionalize the law of torts is the looming specter of Lochner v. New York176—the “poster child for the evils of
‘judicial activism’”177 and the “most widely reviled decision of the last
hundred [or so] years.”178 Even in the punitive damages cases, the
Court has been reluctant to rely openly on substantive due process—
as distinguished from its procedural cousin—for fear of being accused
of Lochnerizing: an accusation that hits particularly close to home
when it comes to protecting economic rights.179 Thus, the Court has
173. Id. at 436.
174. For an argument that the Court’s constitutionalization of defamation law (see discussion
supra note 7) can also be understood as seeking to prevent tort law from being unfairly employed as a form of criminal prosecution in disguise, see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2
(manuscript at 3–8).
175. It is fair to wonder just how much work punishment can and should reasonably be doing
here. Why does it matter to a defendant whether it is told to pay one million dollars as “punishment” or as “compensation”? Either way, it is out the same amount of money. It is true that
unlike a compensatory damages award, a “jury’s . . . imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation.” Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432. But, one wonders whether
that difference would matter much to most defendants. Still, the bottom line, I think, is that the
Court simply feels more comfortable imposing comparatively relaxed constitutional constraints
on the law’s ability to require a defendant to make the plaintiff whole—the typical business of
the civil justice system—than it does in letting down the due process guard when the law is
punishing the defendant by requiring him to pay additional damages above and beyond what is
necessary for full compensation as retribution for wantonly violating a legal norm.
176. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
177. Colby, supra note 21, at 401.
178. David A. Strauss, Why was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003); see also
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 536–37
(2015).
179. See Colby, supra note 21, at 401–08.
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sometimes tried, although rather unconvincingly, to couch its substantive due process objections to punitive damages in procedural
terms.180 Yet, the comparisons to Lochner have been levelled
nonetheless.181
This fear, no doubt, discourages the Court from cavalierly extending the substantive due process right to be free from excessive
punitive damages awards into the much wider realm of compensatory
damages. After all, despite the Court’s concern about the recent explosion in the frequency and size of punitive damages awards, the fact
remains that punitive damages are awarded in only a small fraction of
all civil cases.182 Compensatory damages, on the other hand, are
awarded in virtually every civil case. Policing all of those awards for
constitutional excessiveness would represent a far greater intrusion of
substantive due process into the realm of state law than anything seen
even in the heyday of the Lochner era.183
Even when it comes to the Court’s reluctance to extend procedural
due process rights into other areas of tort law, I suspect that the ghost
of Lochner is lurking in the background. Any time judges invoke any
sort of due process in the economic arena—especially to protect business interests—they must contend with accusations of Lochnerizing.
Thus, for instance, when the Williams Court relied on procedural due
process to place additional limits on punitive damages, the dissenting
Justices simply did not believe that that case was really about procedural due process at all.184 They insisted that the case was really just an
example of Lochner-style substantive due process review. “It matters
not[,]” declared Justice Thomas, “that the Court styles today’s holding
as ‘procedural’ because the ‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing im180. See id. at 402–03.
181. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470–71 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“I am willing to accept the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite its textual limitation to procedure, incorporates certain substantive
guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights; but I do not accept the proposition that it is the secret
repository of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive rights—however fashionable that proposition may have been (even as to economic rights of the sort involved here) at the time of the
Lochner–era cases the plurality relies upon.” (citations omitted)); Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court, 93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1052–53 (2005)
(reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)).
182. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 161 (2002) (estimating that punitive damages are
awarded in 1–8% of civil cases).
183. Cf. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 3 (2011) (noting that the Lochnerera Court actually “upheld the vast majority of laws that had been challenged as infringements
on liberty of contract”).
184. See Colby, supra note 21, at 404–05.
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plementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.”185
In addition, even leaving substantive due process completely to the
side, the argument that the procedural due process right to present
every available defense should be extended to play a major role in
shaping state tort law, including the law of mass-tort class actions,186
has intimate connections to Lochnerism. As Moller explained, in the
nineteenth century, which was around the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was framed, “[c]ourts could, and did, bar defendants
from presenting probative evidence when economy or public policy
demanded. . . . That’s not to say there is no historical support for class
action defendants’ arguments. There is. But it is found in an awkward period: the Lochner era.”187 During that era, “in tandem with its
development of substantive due process, the Lochner Court developed a new conception of procedural due process. Due process, the
Court held, guarantees a right to present a ‘full defense’ to a civil liability judgment, based on ‘every [probative] fact and circumstance’
bearing on liability.”188
It was that line of reasoning that led the high court of New York in
1911—during the heart of the Lochner era—to strike down that
state’s workers’ compensation law as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of employers, who were being forced
to pay compensation for workplace injuries without regard to whether
they were truly at fault.189 The court explained that “[d]ue process of
law implies the . . . right of controverting by proof every material fact
which bears upon the question of right in the matter involved. If any
question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against [the defendant] this is not due process of law.”190 The states are free to alter
their procedural and substantive common law, the court insisted, but
not to the point of abolishing the defendant’s right to establish that it
was not at fault for the injury.191
That high-profile and wildly unpopular decision “help[ed] to launch
the progressive indictment of due process analysis as the handmaiden
185. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. See supra Part III.D.
187. Moller, supra note 99, at 322.
188. Id. at 322–23 (alteration in original) (citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 327, 329
(1932)); see also supra Part III.D (discussing state and federal cases from that era).
189. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911); Goldberg, supra note 91, at
572–73.
190. Ives, 94 N.E. at 439 (quoting Zeigler v. S. & N. R.R. Co., 58 Ala. 594 (1877)).
191. Id. at 439–41.
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of laissez-faire economics.”192 I suspect that today’s U.S. Supreme
Court rightly fears that endorsing these types of arguments again runs
the risk not only of upsetting the post-New Deal settlement and calling back into question established institutions like workers’ compensation but, also, of re-inviting uncomfortable admonishments that the
“Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics.”193
C. The Spirit of Federalism
Finally, it is not difficult to imagine that the Court’s reluctance to
further constitutionalize the law of torts is due in part to the fact that
the Justices who are personally and politically most inclined to sympathize with the tort reform movement are also the Justices who are
most committed to the institution of federalism and, thus, the least
likely to support bold federal judicial intervention into the realm of
traditional state tort law. It is, of course, true that those Justices are
not always completely consistent in their support for federalism and
for reducing federal (and U.S. Supreme Court) intrusion into the
realms traditionally controlled by the states.194 The conservative Justices are often lambasted for abandoning their otherwise firm support
for federalism and states’ rights, particularly when it comes to matters
of federal preemption.195 Indeed, the modern Court’s broad support
for preemption is responsible for a certain amount of the federalization, although not exactly constitutionalization, of state tort law.196
Some have even speculated that this phenomenon “suggests that the
192. Goldberg, supra note 91, at 572.
193. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Peter Smith and I have recently argued that the conservative legal movement appears to be on the brink of reembracing some aspects of Lochnerism. See Colby & Smith, supra note 178. If we are right, then, perhaps, these comparisons will
not be enough to scare the Court away forever. But, for now, this particular sort of broad,
explicit expansion of economic due process rights is probably not an endeavor that the current
Justices are quite prepared to undertake. Indeed, several conservative Justices have sought to
link Lochner and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Colby & Smith, supra note 178, at
560–64, 596, which helps explain why they are particularly skittish about being seen as reviving
Lochnerism.
194. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142–43 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Were the
other Members of this Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty,
they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.”).
195. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need To Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 72–74 (2005).
196. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14–29) (detailing the extent to
which the Court has used the preemption doctrine to federalize tort law seemingly well beyond
Congress’s actual intentions); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National
Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 478 (2002) (“Federalization of tort law is also occurring indirectly, as products increasingly are being regulated at the federal level, which leaves
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Court may not view tort law in the same category as other areas like
criminal law in terms of representing a core state sovereign interest”
that should be protected in the name of federalism.197
But, I do not believe that is quite right. I suspect that to the Justices, in terms of constitutional federalism, there is a world of
difference between the Court finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Congress exercised its unquestioned power to displace
state tort law, and the Court choosing to displace state tort law on its
own, as a matter of constitutional law, thus permanently limiting the
ability of the states to govern themselves even in the absence of congressional regulation.198
It is more difficult for the Justices who claim to be committed
to federalism to get behind actions of the latter sort, even if they
would politically approve of the results that would come from
doing so. Thus, Justices Scalia and Thomas have generally dissented from the Court’s constitutionalizion even of punitive damages,
concluding that the “Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our Nation’s legal culture (no matter
how much in need of correction it may be).”199 With the Court’s
conservative Justices worried about federalism concerns and
its liberal Justices, perhaps less likely to perceive profound unfairness in the unreformed tort system in the first place,200 it is diffiindividual tort suits vulnerable to either a preemption defense or a defense of regulatory
compliance.”).
197. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 196, at 509.
198. Cf. Paul D. Clement & Viet D. Dinh, When Uncle Sam Steps In, LEGAL TIMES, June 19,
2000, at 66, 66 (“[T]here is no real clash between the Court’s true federalism decisions . . . and its
preemption decisions.”).
199. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 472 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., concurring) (“State legislatures and courts have ample authority to eliminate any perceived ‘unfairness’ in the common-law punitive damages regime . . . . The plurality’s
continued assertion that federal judges have . . . power to impose a standard of ‘reasonable
punitive damages’ through the clumsy medium of the Due Process Clause serves only to . . .
reduce the incentives for the proper institutions of our society to undertake that task.” (citations
omitted)).
200. See, e.g., Mark A. Hofmann, Supreme Court Nominee’s Tort Reform Stance Praised, BUS.
INS. (May 11, 2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100511/NEWS/100519
979 (quoting Victor Schwartz, General Counsel of the American Tort Reform Association, who
worked with future-Justice Kagan during her time in the Clinton Administration and found that
she was “distinctly pro-plaintiff” and “had a clear hand” in the President’s vetoing a tort reform
bill); Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 46 (1996) (urging lawyers to “challenge overreactions
that undermine the principles of our judicial system” and noting, by way of example, that “legislators have introduced bills that place arbitrary limits on jury verdicts in personal injury cases[,]”
which is “inconsistent with the premise of the jury system”).
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cult to count to five votes for the further constitutionalization of
torts.201
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court has, to a substantial degree, constitutionalized the law of punitive damages. But, it has not constitutionalized
many other aspects of tort law despite the facts that: (1) the doctrinal
framework is in place to do so; and (2) the business community has
been vigorously pushing the Court in that direction. The business
community will, no doubt, continue to prod. And, if the Justices ever
reach the conclusion that the tort system has become profoundly and
catastrophically unfair—and that the political branches of government
are not going to do anything about the problem—perhaps the Court
will take the next step. But, for the reasons discussed in this Article, I
do not believe that is likely to happen any time soon.

201. It does appear that Justice Scalia might have been on board with one expansion of the
Constitution into the realm of torts: the use of the right to present every available defense to
limit the states’ ability to streamline the adjudication of mass tort class actions. See supra note
148 and accompanying text. But, with Justice Scalia’s recent passing, that vote has been lost.
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